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THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND: INTERNATIONAL
RESTRICTIONS VS. MANIFEST DESTINY
Tod Leaven* & Christopher Dodge**
At this time, it is not in the best interest of the United States to
adopt, join, or participate in any international treaty resembling a
cyberspace extension of the existing "conventional" international
laws of warfare. With the activation of the United States Cyber
Command, the United States has begun to take the necessary steps
to ensure better international cyberspace compliance. The high
technology and resource thresholds present in conventional
warfare provide warning signs which allow nations to monitor
each other for treaty compliance and provide time for measures,
such as sanctions, to halt any non-compliant behavior. Cyber-
warfare, on the other hand, exposes nations to virtually limitless
sudden and immediate attacks, without providing these similar
warnings. The advent of cyber-attacks in warfare illustrates how
technology can suddenly advance so far and so quickly that the
framework of prior treaties is completely inadequate in handling
these technological advances. However, lessons learned from
prior treaties, notably the series of chemical warfare treaties, can
guide the United States' pursuit of peace through this next
technological hurdle. Finally, because of the need to secure its
leadership in cyberspace, the United States must currently operate
efficiently and effectively without the hindrances of an
international treaty.
I. INTRODUCTION
United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
commissioned the United States Cyber Command
("USCYBERCOM") on June 23, 2009, in order "to coordinate
Pentagon efforts in the emerging battlefield of cyberspace and
1
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computer-network security."' Although the mission statement of
USCYBERCOM includes the goals to "prepare to, and when
directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in
order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom
of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries," 2 Lt.
Gen. Keith Alexander, director of USCYBERCOM, maintains that
"[tihis is not about efforts to militarize cyberspace, . . . [r]ather it's
about safeguarding the integrity of our military system."' While
USCYBERCOM may not have utilized cyberspace in this capacity
yet, offensive strikes through cyberspace have previously been
conducted by nation-states,4 and possibly civilians.' But,
* Tod M. Leaven is a civil litigation attorney at North Carolina Prisoner Legal
Services and a former Counterintelligence Agent for the United States Army.
** Christopher Dodge is a J.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina
School of Law, class of 2012.
1 Thom Shanker, New Military Command for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/technology/24cyber.html.
2 Fact Sheets, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/cc (last visited Sept. 11, 2010, 1:32 PM).
3 Mike Mount, U.S. Won't Militarize Cyberspace, Nominee Says, CNN (April
16, 2010, 12:04 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2010 /POLITICS/04/
16/military.cyberspace/. This relates to external threats only, since currently
"[t]he U.S. military is not allowed to operate within the boundaries of the United
States unless authorized by the president. DHS [Department of Homeland
Security] is on [sic] charge of cybersecurity inside the border of the United
States." Id. But see Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare,
WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/NA WSJ PUB:
SB]0001424052748703340904575284964215965730.html ("Cyber Command,
if asked, would provide 'support' to the Department of Homeland Security to
protect networks running the government or key infrastructure, [General
Alexander] said. The military also has a strong interest in ensuring the security
of some private networks, such as power, because 9 0% of the military's power
is provided by the private sector, [General Alexander] said.").
4 John Markoff, Georgia Takes a Beating in the Cyberwar with Russia, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/georgia-takes-
a-beating-in-the-cyberwar-with-russia. The U.S. has engaged in cyber-warfare
as early as June 1982 when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency used a "logic
bomb" to explode a portion of a gas pipeline in the Soviet Union. Matt Murphy,
War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792?storyid=16478792.
Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2007). The exact identity
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capabilities such as those presented by cyber-warfare present an
argument for a complete overhaul of how current international law
should be applied to the new challenges presented by cyber-
warfare.'
Largely because the weapons of cyber-warfare differ
substantially from those of conventional warfare,' this Recent
Development argues that entering into an international treaty at
this time would not be in the best interests of the United States.
This Recent Development instead provides that, with the
commission of USCYBERCOM, the United States has begun to
take the necessary steps to further assert and maintain dominance
in cyber-warfare, enabling the United States to wait until more
information is available to better analyze its position before
entering into an international cyber-warfare treaty. Part II of this
Recent Development briefly discusses the current social climate
behind the movement for an international treaty on cyber-warfare,
as well as similar movements for international treaties in the past.
Part III illustrates the dangerous particularities present in cyber-
warfare. Part IV discusses how cyber-warfare is currently being
addressed, the recent proposals for an international treaty on cyber-
warfare, and why the United States should not take part in such a
treaty at this time. This Recent Development concludes by arguing
of the Russian attackers against Estonia in 2007 remains uncertain, although "[a]
group of Russian civilians claim to have operated under the authority of the
Russian government." Noah Shachtman, Kremlin Kids: We Launched the
Estonian Cyber War, WIRED MAGAZINE (Mar. 11, 2009),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro. There are also
reports of the attacks originating from multiple Russian civilian hackers
organized through chat boards. See Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most
Wired Country in Europe, WIRED MAGAZINE (Aug. 21, 2007),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff estonia?currentPage
=all.
' See generally Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating
Cyber Attacks, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259 (2009) (arguing for an
intent-based approach to govern cyber-warfare); RiCHARD A. CLARKE &
ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT TREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2010) (Arguing for a "Cyber War Limitation
Treaty" ("CWLT") akin to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of the Cold
War).
7 See id. at 261-63.
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that it is not in the best interest of the United States to enter into an
international cyber-warfare treaty at this time.
II. LESSONS LEARNED
A. The Social Climate Behind the Current Treaty
Over the past thirty years, the world has rapidly moved from
being run by telephones, typewriters, and file cabinets to being run
by computers.' This transformation has affected nearly every facet
of civilization-commerce, energy, education, agriculture,
manufacturing, medicine, leisure, and the military.' Globalization
and efficiency have exploded exponentially.o This tumultuous
period of technological leaps coincided with the fall of Soviet
Russia, a fall that left a power vacuum over half of the world."
Current and emerging powers are still racing to fill this power
See generally Yannis Veneris, Modeling the Transition from the Industrial
to the Informational Revolution, 22 ENV'T AND PLAN. A 399 (1990).
9 See, e.g., JOHN C. LEATHERMAN, INTERNET-BASED COMMERCE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES (2000), available at
http://www.eda.gov/PDF/ leatherman.pdf; SMART GRID, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY
DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
http://www.oe.energy.gov/smartgrid.htm; Maya Simon et al., The Internet and
Education, PEW INTERNET (Sept. 1, 2001) http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/
2001 /The-Internet-and-Education.aspx; See 2009 World Congress on Computers
in Agriculture Convention program guide, http://www.wcca2009.org/
documents/OnsiteProgramv007_000.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (illustrating
current issues in agriculture and computers); JAMES CORTADA, THE DIGITAL
HAND: How COMPUTERS CHANGED THE WORK OF AMERICAN
MANUFACTURING, TRANSPORTATION, AND RETAIL INDUSTRIES passim (2004);
Lindsey T. Goehring, Recent Development, H.R. 2068: Expansion of Quality or
Quantity in Telemedicine in the Rural Trenches of America?, 11 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ON. 99 (2009); Paul N. Edwards, Why Build Computers? The Military
Role in Computer Research, in THE CLOSED WORLD: COMPUTERS AND THE
POLITICS OF DISCOURSE IN COLD WAR AMERICA 43 (1996).
10 See generally INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION,
http://www.ifg.org/about.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (illustrating general
issues and concerns with the rapid pace of globalization).
" WOODFORD MCCLELLAN, RUSSIA, A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET PERIOD 323-
40 (1986) (detailing the aims of Soviet foreign policy and the extent of global
dominance and influence).
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vacuum.12 It is natural that life-changing and potentially dangerous
technological leaps amidst global insecurity would heighten
sensitivities about the horrors of technology run amuck.13 An
international treaty banning the ill use of this technology is a
natural impulse. This current global insecurity is most similar to
the global insecurity during the late industrial revolution.
The best lessons on dealing with proposed cyber-warfare
treaties come from the history of a series of chemical warfare
treaties coinciding with this same late industrial revolution
timeframe.14 Unlike nuclear weapons, for which overwhelming
resource demands serve as a gatekeeper," chemical weapons are
by and large cheap and readily accessible.16 Fortunately, state-
12 See generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CHINA'S GROWTH AND
INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
(2004) (Occasional Paper 232), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/op/232/op232.pdf.
1 Jason Manning, The Computer Revolution, THE EIGHTIES CLUB, THE
POLITICS AND PoP CULTURE OF THE 1980s (2000),
http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id325.htm (summarizing the polarizing fears and
cheers of the computer revolution).
14 Actually, the first chemical warfare treaties were much earlier, but they
were punctuated and highly focused. The Strasbourg agreement was signed
August 27, 1675, between the French and the Germans, banning the use of
"perfidious and odious" toxic devices. This agreement was formed in the wake
of the "siege of the city of Groningen, where Christoph Bernhard van Galen, the
Bishop of Mtinster, employed several different explosive and incendiary devices
containing belladonna alkaloids intended to produce toxic fumes." Corey J.
Hilmas et al., History of Chemical and Biological Warfare, in MEDICAL
ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE II (Shirley D. Tuorinsky et al. eds., 2008).
15 See ARJUN MAKHIJANI ET AL., INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL. RESEARCH,
URANIUM ENRICHMENT, JusT PLAIN FACTS TO FUEL AN INFORMED DEBATE ON
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR POWER (Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, 2004), available at
http://www.ieer.org/reports/uranium/enrichment.pdf.
16 For example, Zyklon-B, a common and readily accessible pesticide, was the
gassing agent utilized by Nazi Germany in its extermination camps.
CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE
EVOLUTION OF NAZI JEWISH POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939-MARCH 1942, at 356
(2004).
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sponsored chemical warfare has largely disappeared.17 The success
achieved by the chemical warfare treaties makes them an even
more attractive lesson for effectively negotiating proposed cyber-
warfare treaties.
B. Past Chemical Warfare Treaties
The late nineteenth century saw the birth of the automobile,
airplane, machine-gun, telephone, gasoline engine, radio, and
motion picture." Interestingly, this tumultuous period of
technological leaps also witnessed fourteen major wars. 9 With the
exception of England, all the major world powers fell and
Germany and the United States expanded quickly to fill the
vacuum.20 Fearful of the combination of the world's first large
scale production of chemicals, the exponential advancement of
metallurgy and weaponry, and Russia's diminishing stature as
compared with its more aggressive neighbors, Tsar Nicholas II
proposed the Hague Convention of 1899.21 The second declaration
7 The only modem state sponsored chemical warfare was during the Vietnam
War and the Iran-Iraq war. See, e.g., Tom Fawthrop, Vietnam's War Against
Agent Orange, BBC NEWS (June 14, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/health/3798581.stm; Elaine Sciolino, Iraq Chemical Arms Condemned, but
West Once Looked the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/13/world/threats-responses-iranians-iraq-
chemical-arms-condemned-but-west-once-looked.html.
18 PETER N. STEARNS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY 43-
57 (2nd ed. 1998).
19 The Second Opium War (1856-1860), the American Civil War (1861-
1865), the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), the
Third Carlist War (1872-1876), the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), the Aceh
War (1873-1904), the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), the Anglo-Egyptian War
(1882), the First Franco-Dahomean War (1890), the Second Franco-Dahomean
War (1892-1894), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Spanish-
American War (1898), and the Second Boer War (1899-1902). See DALE E.
FLOYD, THE WORLD BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARMED LAND CONFLICT FROM
WATERLOO TO WORLD WAR I: WARS, CAMPAIGNS, BATTLES, REVOLUTIONS,
REVOLTS, COUPS D'ETAT, INSURRECTIONS, RIOTS, ARMED CONFRONTATIONS
passim (1979).
2 0 JOHN HAYWOOD, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE 19TH CENTURY WORLD 1783-
1914, at 5.03-5.04 (2002).
21 Michael L. Nash, A Century of Arbitration: The International Court of
Justice, 274 CONTEMP. REV. 1 (1999).
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of this convention was a ban on the use of projectiles that
"diffus[ed] ... asphyxiating or deleterious gases."22 The second
Hague convention in 1907 added a ban on "poison or poisoned
weapons. "23 Though well-attended, the two Hague Conventions
fell victim to the expansive foreign policies of the great powers:
the German Empire, the Russian Empire, the British Empire,
France, and the United States. The French were the first to use
chemical weapons during World War I in the early Twentieth
Century, but the German Empire soon followed suit.24 Thus
despite the treaties in place, by the War's end, chlorine, phosgene,
and mustard gases were manufactured and utilized by every major
combatant.25
Though touted today as the first successful treaties in the
nascent body of the international law of war, the Hague
Conventions were an abysmal failure regarding chemical weapons.
This was because countries still considered chemical weaponry
necessary for obtaining a tactical advantage during warfare. The
state that could deploy the deadliest gas with the greatest precision
could maximize casualties amongst opponents while minimizing
its own losses. During the Crimean War in 1854, British chemist
and noted politician Lyon Playfair2 6 rationalized chemical warfare
to the British Ordinance Department by stating:
22 Hague Convention of 1899, Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases,
Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839-40.
23 Hague Convention of 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Pt. IV, § 11, Ch. 1, art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2301-02.
24 Michael Duffy, Weapons of War Poison Gas, FIRST WORLD WAR
http://www.firstworldwar.com/weaponry/gas.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). At
the time of the armistice in 1918, a single plant in Ohio was producing daily
more than ten tons of lewisite, a blistering gas more lethal than mustard gas, in
preparation for a planned offensive in 1919. See, e.g., Joel A. Vilensky & Pandy
R. Sinish, Weaponry: Lewisite-America's World War I Chemical Weapon,
http://www.historynet.com/weaponry-lewisite-americas-world-war-i-chemical-
weapon.htm/2 (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).
25 L.F. HABER, THE POISONOUS CLOUD: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST
WORLD WAR 170 (1986); A.M. PRENTISS, CHEMICALS IN WAR: A TREATISE ON
CHEMICAL WARFARE 661-666 (1937).
26 Playfair lived from 1818 to 1898. His very successful political career in
England included Postmaster General (1873-1874), Chairman of Ways and
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It is considered a legitimate mode of warfare to fill shells with molten
metal which scatters among the enemy, and produced the most frightful
modes of death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men without
suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible.
War is destruction, and the more destructive it can be made with the
least suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous method of
protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be used to
lessen the suffering of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to
death.27
This sentiment was echoed throughout the Hague conventions
and World War I. It was not until 1925, after the world sobered up
to the suffering brought about by chemical weapons, that the
global powers were able to formulate a more thoughtful, respected,
and enduring ban on chemical warfare.28
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, commonly referred to as the Geneva
Protocol, was signed in 1925.29 This treaty only prohibited the
initial use of chemical weapons and left open the possibility of
unlimited production, storage, and retaliation against a chemical
Means (1880-1883), and Vice-President of the Committee on Education (1886).
He was ennobled as a Baron, was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of
the Bath, and the Royal Institute of Public Health awarded him the Harben Gold
Medal in 1897. WEMYSS REID, MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF LYON
PLAYFAIR passim (1899), available at http://books.google.com/
books?id=YpbKDTpVOAcC&pg=PR7&source-gbsselected pages&cad=3#v
=onepage&q&f-false.
27 Hilmas, supra note 14, at 11 (quoting C.A. Browne, Early References
Pertaining to Chemical Warfare, 8 CHEMICAL WARFARE 22,22-23 (1922)).
28 It is estimated that chemical warfare during the First World War produced
1,296,853 casualties. A.M. PRENTISS, CHEMICALS IN WAR, A TREATISE ON
CHEMICAL WARFARE 661-666 (1937). It is estimated that British casualties
alone were 185,000 injured and 8,700 dead. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE
RESEARCH INST., THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE:
VOL. 1 THE RISE OF CB WEAPONS 130 (1971).
29 The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17,
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S 65.
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warfare initiator.30 This strategy was overwhelmingly successful.
World War II, a war notorious for genocide and despicable
barbarism, witnessed only a few isolated instances of chemical
weapon field use by the Japanese in the Pacific, and even then it
was never against Westerners.3 1 The major powers of the middle
Twentieth Century continued chemical weapons production at an
unprecedented level, 32 but the fear of retaliation kept the use of
such gasses at bay.33 With a few notable exceptions, mainly the
Vietnam War and the Iran-Iraq War, the Geneva Protocol
effectively ended state-sponsored chemical warfare.3 4
30 See Text of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/keytext/genprot.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2010).
31 Yuki Tanaka, Poison Gas-The Story Japan Would Like to Forget, 1
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SC. 10, 16-17 (Oct. 1988), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id-tAYAAAAAMBAJ&q-yuki#v-snippet&q=
yuki&f-false. Seven years after they signed the Geneva Protocol, the Italians
used mustard gas during the invasion of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian
War. David Nicholle, ANTHONY MOCKLER, HAILE SELASSIE'S WAR: THE
ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN CAMPAIGN, 1935-1941, at 81 (1984). However, this was
not officially part of World War II. Id.
32 See, e.g., Burton Wright III, The Chemical Warfare Service Prepares for
World War II, ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/
issues/NovDec98/MS274.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2010); A Short History of the
Development of Nerve Gases, NOBLIS, INC., http://www.noblis.org/
MissionAreas/nsi/BackgroundonChemicalWarfare/HistoryofChemicalWarfare/P
ages/HistoryNerveGas.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2010) (discussing Nazi
Germany's discovery and manufacture of Tabun, Sarin, and Soman).
3 Adolph Hitler, a casualty of World War I gassing, refused to use chemical
weapons out of fear of Allied retaliation. Barton J. Bernstein, Why We Didn't
Use Poison Gas in World War II, AM. HERITAGE,
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1985/5/1985 5 40.shtm
I (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). Of course, there was no similar fear of retaliation
from European Jews, whom the Nazis massacred at extermination camps by
utilizing Zyklon-B, a cyanide-based pesticide. CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING,
THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE EVOLUTION OF NAzI JEWISH
POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939-MARCH 1942 passim (2004).
3 Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war was a violation of
the Geneva Protocol. Iraq had reserved the right to use chemical weapons
against non-treaty participants, but Iran ratified the treaty prior to the conflict.
Geneva Protocol reservations, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE http://archives.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cbwarfare/cbw research
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Nearly seventy years after the Geneva Protocol, and almost one
hundred years after the first Hague Convention, the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly
known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, was signed.3' As its
full title details, it was a comprehensive ban which included the
destruction of current stockpiles.3 ' As of July 8, 2010, more than
sixty percent of the world's chemical stockpiles had been
destroyed. Why were the Geneva Protocol and the Chemical
Weapons Convention so successful? Not only was the dream of
chemical weapons as a mystical panacea thoroughly crushed by
harsh reality, but the specter of runaway science had diminished
when the world realized that the industrial revolution was not
Armageddon.
III. THE DIFFICULTIES OF CYBER-WARFARE
A. Estonia, 2007: Anonymity in Cyber-Warfare
doc/cbw historical/cbw-hist-geneva-res.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). The
United States utilized chemical weaponry on mass-scale during the Vietnam
War. However, the U.S. did not ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol until 1975,
after its involvement in Vietnam. See Fawthorpe, supra note 17.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Nov. 23,
1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=XXVi-
3&chapter=26&1ang-en.
36 ARTICLES OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION,
http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/ (last visited Nov.
9,2010).
37 Global Campaign to Destroy Chemical Weapons Passes 60 Percent Mark,
ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
http://www.opcw.org/nc/news/article/global-campaign-to-destroy-chemical-
weapons-passes-60-percent-mark/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). See Karen
Drewen, U.S. Army Bids Farewell to Modern Chemical Weapons Capability,
NSCMP Completes Final Step in Destroying Binary Chemical Weapons,
ARMY.MIL NEWS (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/11/29/
6348-us-army-bids-farewell-to-modem-chemical-weapons-capability-nscmp-
completes-fmal-step-in-destroying-binary-chemical-weapons.
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In April 2007, several Estonian Web sites, including some
important to their government infrastructure, were attacked and
effectively shut down as a result of a cyber-attack.3 8 Although
many in Estonia suspected involvement from the Russian
government during these cyber-attacks, 39 an Estonian newspaper
instead discovered that the three nations generating the most traffic
to the newspaper's Web site were Egypt, Vietnam, and Peru.40
Such traffic would obviously be highly unusual for the Web site of
an Estonian newspaper.4 1 Attacks like this are possible because of
the potential difficulty in ascertaining the identity or location of the
attacker.4 2 In fact, the attacker can make the cyber-attack seem as
if it came from a completely different location.43 Because of this
anonymity, despite the widespread belief that the Russian
government was involved at least to some extent, there still exists
uncertainty as to whether the Russian government did in fact
participate in the attacks.44
This unsolved attack against Estonia was made possible
because the characteristics of the Internet create a scenario where
any online computer in the world can be the source of the attack.45
Easy access to such effective offensive machinery provides a
3 Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Three Years Later: A Progress Report on
Combating Cyber Attacks, 13 No. 8 J. INTERNET L. 22, 22 (Feb. 2010).
39 See Hollis, supra note 5, at 1025.
40 Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,
WIRED MAGAZINE, Issue 15.09 (Aug. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff estonia.
41 See id
42 Hollis, supra note 5, at 1031-32.
43 Id Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 892 (1999).
44 Jonathan A. Ophardt, Cyber Warfare And The Crime Of Aggression: The
Need For Individual Accountability On Tomorrow's Battlefield, 2010 DUKE L. &
TECH. REv. 3, 22 (2010), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/
articles/201 0dltr003.html.
45 Id 21. One of the methods used in such a scenario is the use of botnets.
Id 20. Defining botnets, Ophardt says that "[s]ome malware allows targeted
computers to be 'slaved' to the commands of a single operator who can remotely
control aspects of their behavior. These 'slave' computers are commonly known
as 'botnets." Id
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cheap means for an attacker to deal devastating blows to an enemy
while maintaining a high level of anonymity.46 Such potential
could make cyber-warfare a top weapon of choice for a terrorist
organization."7 Because of the uncertainty of being able to both
detect a cyber-attack and properly identify the source of a cyber-
attack, it is likely that it will take several cyber-attacks before
action is taken in response.48
B. Difficulty Identiying the Origin of the Attack
United States Web sites have also been subject to several
cyber-attacks.4 9 These cyber-attacks can be traced back as far as
2001.5o Even the British, attacked by Chinese hackers in 2007, had
difficulty discerning whether the attacks were instigated by the
People's Liberation Army or by individuals acting independent of
the Chinese government." Accurately discovering the source of
the attacks is important because effective deterrence against cyber-
attacks requires proper identification of the attacker.52 This
difficulty was exemplified when cyber-attacks occurred against the
United States and South Korea in July 2009, and, rather than
originating from North Korea or China as expected," the attacks
were based from a server in Miami, Florida.54 Furthermore, there
46 1d 21.
47 McGavran, supra note 6, at 265. McGavran exemplifies the capabilities of
attackers using these services, saying "[b]ecause proficient cyber warriors are
capable of masking their locations, it is a nigh-impossible task to trace the
perpetrators. The trail becomes cold after these attacks in hours or even
minutes." Id.
48 MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR 43 (2009),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND MG877.pdf.
49 John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty for
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/
world/28cyber.html.
50 d.
51 Richard Norton-Taylor, Titan Rain-how Chinese hackers targeted
Whitehall, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2007 03.06 BST),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/sep/04/news.internet.
52 LIBICKI, supra note 48, at 41.
JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 193 (2010).
54 U.S. Government Sites Among Those Hit by Cyberattack, CNN (July 8,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/07/08/government.hacking/index.html.
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may not be anyone to blame at all, as a suspected cyber-attack
could even be a complete accident." Even if a cyber-attacker may
have been conducting cyber-warfare for an extended period of time
but had not yet been identified by the nation they were allegedly
attacking,5 6 the attacker may be unsure why the cyber-attack is
only now being responded to." In sum, the inability to pinpoint
the cyber-attacker creates serious questions and uncertainty about
how the United States should respond to an attack."
C. Difficulty Identifying the Parties who Performed the Attack
Such anonymous capabilities could even make it seem as if an
innocent nation instigated an attack, as was exemplified when an
anonymous distributed denial of service attack, originating from
the United States, attacked the Web site of the Georgian president
in July 2008.59 However, a few weeks later, President Obama, then
still campaigning for office, indicated that it was Russia who had
issued these cyber-attacks.60 Such a statement has considerable
merit when taking into consideration the fact that these (allegedly
Russian) cyber-attacks took place at the same time as the
conventional Russian attacks against Georgia in 2008.6 There are
reports, however, that these attacks were not organized by the
Russian government as President Obama had believed, or from the
United States, but were actually instigated by a vast number of
LIBICKI, supra note 48, at 45. Examples of accidents like these "could be
bad software (which has explained many widespread outages), human error, or
natural accidents (the Northeast power outage in 2003 can be traced back to
untended trees in Ohio)." Id.
56 See id. at 42.
57id.
58 CARR, supra note 53, at 176-77.
59 Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An
Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. L.
REv. 43, 57 (2009).
60 Gregory Hafkin, The Russo-Georgian War of 2008: Developing the Law of
Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 219,
228 (2010). Hafkin also states that President Obama "accused Russia of 'clear
and continued violation of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity,' [and]
demanded that Russia withdraw ground troops from Georgia." Id
6i See McGavran, supra note 6, at 265.
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unknown individuals who were capable of such a large-scale
cyber-attack.62
In addition to nation-states and individual hackers, cyber-
attacks may even be performed by an apparent non-combatant.63
This proved especially true when a Russian journalist was able to
partake in the Georgian cyber-attacks by simply acquiring the
means to do so from the Internet.64 This journalist, Evgeny
Morozov, stated that "in less than an hour, I had become an
Internet soldier. I didn't receive any calls from Kremlin operatives;
nor did I have to buy a Web server or modify my computer in any
significant way."6" Morozov even began his transformation
without any knowledge of cyber-attacks.66 It appears evident that
cyber-warfare presents a new challenge to international security,
where seemingly anyone can become an enemy of the state.67 With
possible or alleged cyber-combatants ranging from civilians, to
journalists, to nation-states themselves, these events show that
individuals, not just nation-states, are ready and willing to
affirmatively use cyber-warfare against another nation."
62 Kastenberg, supra note 59, at 63. Contra Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Towards a
Cyberspace Legal Regime in the Twenty-First Century: Considerations for
American Cyber-Warriors, 87 NEB. L. REv. 712, 720 (2009) ("However, only a
nation-state, in my judgment, could cause the kind of debilitating damage that
would equate to defeat in war.")
63 See Ophardt, supra note 44, 12-23. Ophardt points out that the Russian
cyber-attacks against Georgia in 2008 were, at least in part, carried out by
individuals instead of a state. Ophardt, supra note 44, 2, 12.
64 See Kastenberg, supra note 59, at 59.
65 Evgeny Morozov, An Army of Ones and Zeroes-How I became a soldier in
the Georgia-Russia cyberwar, SLATE, (Aug. 14, 2008, 5:31 PM), http://www.
slate.com/id/2197514.
66 Id. In his account, Morozov states that he was "acting entirely on [his] own
and using only a laptop and an Internet connection." Id.
67 Ophardt, supra note 44, 21.
68 Christopher V. Greene, Cyberwarfare and Our Allies: The Importance of
Theater Security Cooperation, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 14 (Oct 23, 2009),
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA513954&Location=U2
&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. At one point, "in 2001 ... aNavy P-3 surveillance plane
colli[sion] with a Chinese fighter plane ... [was followed by] 'a huge increase in
attacks on United States government computer targets from sources that could
not be identified."' Markoff & Kramer, supra note 49.
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Unlike conventional warfare, cyber-warfare does not require
military training for participants to actively engage in the act.69
This relatively simple method of becoming a cyber-combatant70
can become even more powerful when a nation such as Russia
actively encourages its citizens to participate in cyber-attacks.71
Therefore, the relative simplicity and frequency of cyber-attacks,
combined with possible state encouragement of such actions,
shows that preventing cyber-attacks can present extraordinary
difficulties to United States national security forces.72 With the
new dangers of cyber-warfare, some argue that both the United
States and international organizations such as NATO need to
develop strategies to counter the potential effectiveness and
lethality of cyber-warfare.
IV. PROPER DECISIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. How Cyber-Warfare is Being Addressed Now
The capabilities and implications of cyber-warfare have led to
a widespread call for an international treaty expanding the current
application of the law of war to cyber-warfare.74 Currently, the law
of war under the Geneva Conventions could apply to a large-scale
69 CARR, supra note 53, at 27.
70 See Morozov, supra note 65.
71 CARR, supra note 53, at 119. Carr states that the Russian government may
operate "through Nashi and other groups whose membership includes hackers,
resulting in an organized yet open call for unaffiliated hackers to join in." Id
Nashi, a Russian youth movement, may also have been involved in the
government-sponsored attack on Estonia in 2007. Scott J. Shackelford, From
Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 192, 206 (2009). For a detailed news report on
involvement between the Russian government and Nashi, see Tim Whewell, The
Kremlin's New Commissars, BBC (July 12, 2006, 11:34 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/5169610.stm.
72 Shackelford, supra note 38, at 23.
73 id.
74 See John Naughton, The War of the Cyberworlds is Coming, and We'd
Better Be Ready, THE OBSERVER (June 28, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2009/jun/28/cyber-warfare-internet-attacks.
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cyber-warfare." This body of law has been wholly criticized as
being completely inapplicable to the unique challenges that cyber-
warfare presents.76 Currently, the main obstacle to adopting an
international cyber-warfare treaty is that the United States does not
believe that now is the time for such a treaty.7 This stance, in our
present opinion, is proper for the United States. As far as the law
governing cyber-warfare is concerned, at the very least, nations are
under an obligation "to prevent and respond to cyberterrorist
acts."" The commission of USCYBERCOM may be the
beginning of such greater domestic protection against the threat of
cyber-attacks, and it currently has better capabilities in dealing
" Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J.
INT'L L. 391, 411-12 (2010).
76 See Hollis, supra note 5, at 1029 (arguing for an "international law for
information operations"). Specifically, Hollis argues that "the existing system
suffers from several, near-fatal conditions: uncertainty (i.e., states lack a clear
picture of how to translate existing rules into the 10 [information operations]
environment); complexity (i.e., overlapping legal regimes threaten to overwhelm
state decision makers seeking to apply IO); and insufficiency (i.e., the existing
rules fail to address the basic challenges of modern conflicts with non-state
actors and to facilitate IO in appropriate circumstances)." Id.
1 Shackelford, supra note 71, at 221. But see Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs
Talk on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033409045752849642159657
30.html (stating that the United States has begun to consider negotiations with
Russia over an international cyberwar treaty after Russia had begun
negotiations); Ellen Nakashima, 15 nations agree to start working together to
reduce cyberwarfare threat, WASH. POST (July 17, 2010), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/AR2010071605882.
html (reporting that several different nations have agreed to take steps to reduce
the dangers of cyber-warfare). We believe, however, that these new
developments do not mark an alteration in United States policy to immediately
enter into a cyber-warfare treaty, but rather, a proper stance by the United States
to remain open to the possibility of a treaty in the future.
71 Christopher E. Lentz, A State's Duty to Prevent and Respond to
Cyberterrorist Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 799, 823 (2010). This obligation arises
under "Security Council Resolution 1373, which creates binding duties upon all
states to prevent and respond to 'terrorist acts."' Id at 801. Lentz argues that
"[i]nternational law should recognize that states have a duty to prevent and
respond to cyberterrorist acts. Security Council Resolution 1373 created a
similar duty regarding terrorist acts, and this should be expanded into the
frontier of cyberspace." Id at 816.
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with the unique problems of cyber-warfare than other possible
countermeasures.79
Cyber-warfare is not left completely untouched by the laws
currently on the books in the United States, however, as some laws
"dealing with international radio or wire communications, and
malicious interference with satellites, similar to wire fraud" could
apply to cyber-attacks.so These laws could be applied when a
cyber-attack is not serious or on a large enough scale to merit
international attention." Laws like these that are already in place
may keep open the possibility of domestic action against cyber-
attacks.82 Therefore, although current international laws may not
be sufficient to effectively counter cyber-attacks,83 it is certainly
possible to use current domestic military procedures to combat
cyber-terrorism in the United States.84 Furthermore, these laws
could be implemented in a much quicker, more efficient, and more
self-serving fashion than by entering into an international
agreement."
As one might expect, current international agreements that
might be translated to cyber-warfare are presumed to concern
relations among different nations, instead of individual actors."6
Uncertainty still remains, therefore, in how the same law can be
translated to individuals, acting independently from any
government, who may engage in cyber-warfare.8 7 The difference
is significant because the ability of a nation to both properly
79 See Mount, supra note 3.
80 Shackelford, supra note 71, at 225.
si Id.
82 Id. at 225-26.
8, See Hollis, supra note 5.
84 See CARR, supra note 53, at 188-89.
85 See id. at 74. Carr states that "[g]lobal cooperation may be a reality one
day, but unless something changes to pressure sanctuary states into changing
their behavior, there is no impetus for them to do so." Id. Carr also says that
states may become "sanctuary states," Id., if there is "repeated failure by a state
to take criminal action against its attackers." Id. at 48.
86 Hollis, supra note 5, at 1047.
87 Id. at 1048.
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prevent and retaliate against a cyber-attack depends on this
determination."
One example of how important this determination could be is
that, at least according to the International Court of Justice, use of
military force may not be applicable against an individual who
engages in cyber-warfare, leaving the responsibilities instead to the
laws of the state that has been, or believes itself to have been,
attacked.89 The problem with this approach to non-state actors is
that the attacked state may not be able to use proper defense means
against the attack.9 0 This restriction exists because the ability of a
state to respond is restricted by international agreement, often
described as jus in bello.9 1 Therefore, a response must be
meticulously studied and prepared so as to not be too severe
against the attacker, assuming that the attack is somehow properly
traced to the correct source at all, in order for a response to be both
effective and legal.92
As we have seen, the two initial requirements to defend against
cyber-attacks are proper attribution, followed by the development
of a proportional response.9 3 These factors may be interconnected,
and mishandling either could lead to inadequate and even
disastrous results.94 To satisfy the legal requirements in responding
to cyber-attacks, but still be effective, the state that has been
attacked must therefore do all that it can to ensure that these two
" Id. at 1049.
89 Id
90 d
91 CARR, supra note 53, at 71. According to Carr, "[j]us in bello stands for the
proposition that states do not have a right to use unlimited force against other
states during war." Id. Carr says that "jus in bello uses four basic principles to
regulate the conduct of states during warfare. These are: distinction, necessity,
humanity, and proportionality." Id For greater detail regarding jus in bello in
the modern era, see Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After
September II, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 905 (2002).
92 CARR, supra note 53, at 73. Carr describes these measures, saying, "the
victim-state's system administrator must map out the attacking computer system
to distinguish its functions and the likely consequences that will result from
shutting it down." Id.
93 Shackelford, supra note 71, at 201.
94 CARR, supra note 53, at 73.
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factors are met.95 When these requirements are met, the state could
be shielded from liability for mistakes taken in response to a cyber-
attack. 96 To ensure that a state does not act disproportionally to the
threat or the attack, a balancing test is required which weighs the
strength of the response in relation to the potential danger such a
response will present the state allegedly responsible for the original
cyber-attack. 97
This cyber-invasion will almost certainly be highly
unwelcomed by the state allegedly responsible for the original
attack. 98 Therefore, an alternative response would be to first ask
the state where the attack allegedly began to end the attack, and
only to exert a response by the attacked nation if the first step
proves ineffective. 99  Once these countermeasures are taken,
normal criminal and constitutional law would be applied to judge
the response.0 o This countermeasure system could make effective
response difficult, as there may still be difficulty in determining
which United States department should handle the matter.0 '
However, the previous issues that the United States faced in
applying the current law of war to cyber-warfare might be
alleviated with the commission of USCYBERCOM. 10 2
B. Current Proposals for an International Cyber-Warfare Treaty
Even if a state decides not to try to meet these difficulties
through domestic action, these new difficulties in cyber-warfare
still need to be addressed in a manner that allows for effective state
responses.1 o3 Currently, the two nations in strongest disagreement
95 id.
96
97
98 Hollis, supra note 5, at 1050.
99 Id According to Hollis, "The requested state is expected to comply with
such requests." Id
100 LIBICKI, supra note 48, at 96.
101 Id
102 Lance Whitney, U.S. Cyber Command prepped to launch, CNET (March
23, 2010, 11:47 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009 3-10470186-83.html.
103 David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NATL SEC. L. &
POL'Y 87, 102 (2010). Although he does not give examples of what these
"workable procedures" would be, Graham notes that "there is now a growing
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over an international treaty are the United States and Russia.104
The Russian government currently holds that an international
treaty updating the law of war with a cyber-warfare section is
imperative.'s The United States opposes this view, instead
arguing for cooperative domestic handling among foreign states in
cyber-warfare.o 6 Specifically, the U.S. plan, as identified by
Deputy Defence Secretary William Lynn, advocates for increased
focus and improvement in domestic countermeasures to cyber-
warfare, while discouraging any international treaty on the
matter.'
One of the largest proponents for an international treaty is the
United Nations."o' Specifically, United Nations Secretary-General
Hamadoun Tour6109 stated that "a cyberwar will be worse than a
tsunami-we have to avoid it.".o Unsurprisingly, Tour6 has
pushed for an international treaty regarding cyber-warfare."'
Elsewhere in Europe, NATO has become active in cyber-warfare
countermeasures with the establishment of "the Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence."1 12 One reason that NATO may be
effort to formulate acceptable alternatives to the notion of 'conclusive
attribution."' Id at 93. This means that a state may respond to a cyberattack
"only by directly and conclusively attributing the attack to another state actor."
Id at 101.
104 Markoff & Kramer, supra note 49.
105 Id
106 id
107 US wants NA TO 'cyber shield' (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.theaustralian.
com.au/australian-it/government/us-wants-nato-cyber-shield/story-fn4htb9o-
1225924785541. Lynn's plan involves "five pillars", which include
"recognising cyberspace as the next domain of warfare; the need for active
defences; the protection of critical infrastructure; enhancing collective defence;
and the need to 'marshall our technological prowess."' Id
'os See David Meyer, ITU Head: Cyberwar Could Be 'Worse Than Tsunami',
ZDNET UK, (Sept. 3, 2010, 12:35 PM), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-
threats/2010/09/03/itu-head-cyberwar-could-be-worse-than-tsunami-40089995/.
109 Id
110 Id.
111 Id
112 Barry Rosenberg, NA TO unites to thwart cyber threats, DEFENSE SYSTEMS
(Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.defensesystems.com/articles/2010/04/06/cyber-
defense-nato.aspx.
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at the forefront of the development of new international law is the
heavy involvement of Russia in cyber-warfare."' However,
NATO may not yet be effectively equipped to deal with cyber-
warfare." 4 One of the problems, as has previously been stated, is
the difficulty of understanding how the law of conventional war
applies to cyber-war."' Such possible difficulties were
exemplified when even the Russian cyber-attacks against Estonia
could not warrant NATO protection."'
One way for a treaty to be effective would be to first define
what constitutes a cyber-attack, then to proceed to specify what
law applies to the cyber-attack, as well as explain proper
remedies.1 17 Alternatively, one could look at the cyber-attack itself
and determine the intent of the cyber-attack."' This method may
offer a solution without too much disruption of current
international law, as a cyber-attack would be better defined in the
context of "use of force terms" currently in existence."'
For a state to confidently respond to a cyber-attack, some argue
that properly identifying the source of the attack should not be
necessary, provided that the attacked state acts in "good-faith."1 20
113 McGavran, supra note 6, at 274. For further discussion of Lynn's five
pillar defense argument in respect to NATO policy, see Kevin Coleman, A
NATO Cyber Alliance, DEFENSE TECH (Sept. 20, 2010),
http: //defensetech.org/2010/09/20/a-nato-cyber-alliance.
114 Shackelford, supra note 38, at 25.
115 id
116 LIBICKI, supra note 48, at 179.
117 Shackelford, supra note 38, at 27.
us McGavran, supra note 6, at 272. McGavran argues that "by focusing on
the primary intent, which could be deduced under a totality of circumstances
test, annoyance attacks can be distinguished from attacks that intend to cause
disruption." Id.
19 Id McGavran describes the "consequentiality approach" as where "a
cyber attack would count as the use of force if its effects are the same as those
that would have resulted from conventional military attacks." Id. For more
detail on the history and application of this approach, see generally
Papanastasiou Afroditi, Application of International Law in Cyber Warfare
Operations, SSRN (Sept. 8, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstract=1673785.
120 Matthew Hoisington, Comment, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force
Giving Rise to the Right of Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 439,
453 (Spring, 2009).
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However, states may find difficulty with this standard because
there is currently much confusion as to what constitutes "force"
under the United Nations charter. 12 1 Still, the power of the United
Nations has expanded recently following acts by the United
Nations Security Council attempting to place a greater emphasis on
international security. 2 2 Furthermore, since cyber-warfare may be
properly categorized as subject to "legislative action" under the
United Nations,'23 the United Nations Security Council may be
able to act affirmatively in situations involving cyber-warfare. 124
However, such measures are not always applicable to cyber-
warfare, as certain cyber-attacks which cannot be identified may
not allow for the same response.'25
By contrast, USCYBERCOM may be able to avoid lengthy
processes such as these, as actions taken by USCYBERCOM may
not have to be fully disclosed to the government.126  Even if
disclosure were to be mandated, they would not be subject to
typical review by government as in other agencies, being reviewed
"instead by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees." 127
Despite the possible difficulties this hierarchy may create, 28 such a
scenario may allow USCYBERCOM to become very effective,
121 Id. at 440-41. The U.N. Charter states simply that "All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para.
4.
122 Toby L. Friesen, Article, Resolving Tomorrow's Conflicts Today: How
New Developments Within The U.N. Security Council Can Be Used To Combat
Cyberwarfare, 58 NAVAL L. REV. 89, 109 (2009).
123 Id. at 117-18. Friesen argues that cyber-warfare fits as "[1]egislative
action" because "cyberwarfare is a threat to peace and security," is "immediate
... as demonstrated by the recent attacks against Georgia and Estonia", and
"pose[s] some inherent obstacle to the creation of a consensual international
agreement." Id
124I at .
125 Major Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use
Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REv. 121, 146 (2009).
126 Stephen Dycus, National Leadership, Individual Responsibility:
Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 155, 161 (2010).
127 id
128 id
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because if cyber-defenses "are regarded as 'traditional military
activities,' [USCYBERCOM] might escape both the
presidential findings requirement for covert actions and any
reporting to the intelligence committees."129 Opening up this
freedom for USCYBERCOM to operate may be the answer to
Secretary Lynn's proposal to keep the United States at the
forefront of cyber-warfare activities.130
C. Why Now is Not the Time for a Cyber- Warfare Treaty
The United States should not enter an international cyber-
warfare treaty at this present time because the world does not have
a great enough appreciation for the technology and its
consequences yet to be able to formulate a thoughtful regulatory
treaty; any such treaty, if entered into, would be intrinsically
unenforceable; and tying the hands of the United States, with its
premier position in cyber-space, would only cause global harm.
As with the chemical weapons treaties at the end of the
Industrial Revolution, the world is not able to formulate a
thoughtful, respected, and enduring cyber-warfare treaty.13 '
Chemical warfare was rationalized as a vehicle for Germany to
secure its rapid expansion as a world power, for the Ottoman and
Austria-Hungarian Empires to regain their lost stature, and for the
United Kingdom to maintain global dominance. 3 2  Similarly,
129 Id. at 161-62.
130 See Camille Tuutti, Lynn Details Pentagon's Cyber-Defense Measures,
EXECUTIVEGov (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.executivegov.com/2010/08/lynn-
details-pentagons-cyber-defense-measures.
See supra Part II.B, particularly text accompanying notes 19 24.
132 From 1848 to 1871, the unification of Germany with Prussia brought about
a Navy to Rival England, an army to rival any power in Europe, and growing
influence to rival the former Hapsburgs. HAYWOOD, supra note 20, at 5.11. The
Ottoman Empire had been in existence since 1299 and spanned three continents
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE, at xxvii (G~bor Agoston et al. ed. 2009). During the late Nineteenth
Centuries, the Ottoman Empire had lost much of its territories, had undergone
painful modernization, and had experienced governmental upheavals and boiling
internal ethnic tensions. Id.; see also HAYWOOD, supra note 20, at 5.14. The
Hapsburgs, the ancestry of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, was the most
important royal house in Europe and ruled the Holy Roman Empire from 1438
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cyber-warfare is viewed as a vehicle for China to secure its rapid
expansion as a world power, for Russia and continental Europe to
regain their lost stature, and for the United States (and to some
extent the United Kingdom) to maintain global dominance.133
Though the horrors of World War I need not be repeated for the
world to learn the potential for human suffering brought about by
unfettered cyber-warfare, there does, at a minimum, need to be a
greater appreciation for this potential suffering, if only in theory.'34
to 1740. PETER HAMISH WILSON, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE, 1495-1806, at
72-74 (St. Martin's, NY, 1999). By the late Nineteenth Century, it had lost
much of its territory and European influence. HAYWOOD, supra note 20, at
5.11-5.13. After Napoleon's defeat, the United Kindom was the sole global
power. RONALD HYAM, BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL CENTURY, 1815-1914: A STUDY
OF EMPIRE AND EXPANSION 15 (1976). However, the sun was setting on Pax
Britannica as American and German industrial and military might were
beginning to prove rivals. THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 1-47 (Judith M. Brown et al. ed.) (1999). Though its
territorial expansion was at its zenith shortly after the First World War, the
financial strain of its vast empire, along with negative public sentiment, was
already showing in the late Nineteenth Century. Id.
See, e.g., Charles W. Williamson, Carpet Bombing in Cyberspace, ARMED
FORCES J., http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/05/3375884 (last visited
Nov. 9, 2010).
134 Compare REID, supra note 26 (describing Lyon Playfair's rationalization)
with Hollis, supra note 5:
[Cyber-warfare] has the potential to do through the transmittal of data
streams what militaries have previously done with bombs and missiles
(i.e., depriving the adversary of infrastructure that supports military
operations such as electrical or communication systems). But 10
[information operations] also offers the promise of accomplishing such
goals without as much collateral damage-e.g., disabling an electrical
grid temporarily through CNA [computer network attacks] in lieu of
destroying the power plant that produces the electricity, or using
electronic warfare to disable broadcasting communications in lieu of
bombing the facilities and causing some collateral loss of life.
Hollis, supra note 5, at 1032. Instead of focusing on terrible but highly
plausible outcomes such as the widespread physical collapse of civil
infrastructure, including air traffic control, emergency response systems, and
banking systems, much journalism seems to liken the effects of cyber-warfare to
"being teleported back to the 1970s." Naughton, supra note 74. The advent of
governmental cloud computing makes governmental function even more
sensitive to cyber warfare. See Shahid Kahn, Recent Development,
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Right now, more focus should be on greater global recognition of
this need, rather than on an immediate treaty.
Another reason that now is not the time to enter into a cyber-
warfare treaty is because a treaty lacking any means of
enforcement does more harm than good. A treaty cannot be
enforced if the aggressor is unknown.13 ' Even if a cyber-warfare
treaty were modeled after the Geneva Protocol in that it allowed
for unbridled retaliation, the aggressor's complete anonymity
would shield it from the feared retaliation.136 Even worse, the use
of subterfuge could lead to retaliation upon innocent actors. 13
Until a tracing mechanism is realized, this anonymity aspect
negates any fruits of a treaty.
Even if the U.S. joining an international treaty on cyber-space
is ultimately inevitable, it can be likened to the U.K.'s inevitability
in joining the Eurodollar. Though the United Kingdom joined the
European Union in 1973, it has yet to join the Eurodollar.'38
Professor Minford of the Cardiff Business School summarizes
British skepticism behind continental Europe's political
motivations best when he states that "they want us to join the club
they have in mind, in order to enjoy our assistance (our strengths)
and to limit our ability to compete with it and even undermine it by
doing things differently." 3 9 The U.K.'s abstention from monetary
unity served as a great stabilizer for European trade and commerce
during twenty years of great fluctuations in the Eurodollar value.'40
It is wise for the U.K. to sit out while the imperfections of
monetary unity get ironed out. Likewise, there is similar
"Apps.Gov": Assessing Privacy in the Cloud Computing Era, 11 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ON. 259 (2010).
' See, e.g., LIBICKI, supra note 48, at 41; Ophardt, supra note 44, at TT 21-
22. But see Hoisington, supra note 120, at 453 (stating that identity is not
needed if acting in good faith self-defense).
136 See Hollis, supra note 5, at 1031-32.
137 See Schmitt, supra note 43, at 892; Kastenberg, supra note 59, at 57.
138 ALAN S. MILWARD, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE HISTORY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 4 (Routlage, N.Y., 2005).
139 PATRICK MINFORD, SHOULD BRITAIN JOIN THE EURO-THE CHANCELLOR'S
FIVE TESTS EXAMINED, 126 IEA Occasional Paper 2 (Sept. 2002).
140 See id. at 4-6.
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skepticism in the United States of continental Europe's and
Russia's calls for a cyber-warfare treaty. 4 ' Given its premier
position in cyberspace, it is better if the U.S. abstains from a treaty
on cyber-warfare. With roughly eighty percent of the Internet's
traffic coming through the United States, it would be hard for any
cyber-warfare not to have incursions into the U.S. Internet
infrastructure.142 This necessitates U.S. freedom and flexibility in
handling its responses to cyber-conflicts because tying the hands of
the U.S. with an ill-thought-out treaty could be deleterious to
global cyber-infrastructure. Examples of plausible scenarios which
could impede U.S. efficiency and effectiveness are treaty
overbreadth, where too many events mandate action, and
underbreadth, where too few events are actually actionable. This
can be especially problematic in that the U.S. might be joined into
a conflict wholly outside of its interests or concern solely because
a cyber-ally was targeted. It is wise for the U.S. to allow any
crippling effects of a cyber-warfare treaty to be addressed and
remedied before it joins.
V. CONCLUSION
Cyber-attacks present difficulties to the United States that are
unique and original that any currently proposed international treaty
the United States enters will eventually become adverse to the
interests of the United States at one point or another. To be sure,
this may have been true for several past treaties, but nearly every
aspect of cyber-warfare is more complex, versatile, and easily
accessible to enemies of the United States than any other past or
present threat to national security. Entering into a treaty at this
point could tie the hands of United States security forces security,
as opposed to preventing or stopping any threat. In fact, "the
apparent ease with which a cyber attack may be carried out without
141 Kastenberg, supra note 59, at 48 (citing various Presidential Decision
Directives which basically state two major reasons why other nations would
want to hinder U.S. cyber strength: (1) that the United States is the most
powerful nation on earth and this power is dependent upon critical
infrastructures and cyber-based information systems, and (2) that the U.S.
should review offensive capabilities against enemy computer networks).
142 Id. at 44-47.
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attribution could make it impossible to fight back at all."143 The
mere activation of USCYBERCOM shows that the United States
will not stay idle in cyber-warfare. Domestic improvements are
simply more appealing to the United States in combating cyber-
warfare than entering into an international treaty at this time.
Going forward, USCYBERCOM should only be the beginning in
creating U.S. cyber-security forces.
143 Dycus, supra note 126, at 163.
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